By Louis Phlips
This e-book makes use of online game idea to investigate anti-competitive habit between organisations and to contemplate its implications for festival coverage. themes contain "explicit collusion," "tacit collusion," "semicollusion," and the detection of predatory pricing. The publication discusses numerous eu antitrust judgements and empirical reports intimately.
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Additional info for Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
I think it is quite general. 5) is just a convenient choice of units of measurement. The linearity assumptions can be seen as simplifying approximations: nothing essential is lost by making them. The same is true for the assumption that the firms are symmetric when they are perfectly informed of all decisions at the end of stages 1 and 2. The only problem is to know whether four are still few and six are still many when the firms have different costs and do not know their competitors' costs. 2, that Selten's result still holds under incomplete information!
Cartel laws are good for business. 16) respectively. If the non-collusive game were actually 1 2 If the size of the market is s = 1, then m = 2 and z = 1. There is room for one firm only. If s < 1, m has to be redefined as m = 1 to get z = 0. Please check. For example, with s = 9, m = 6 and n = 9. Cartel laws are good for business 45 played, the industry would end up having z = m—\ firms in it. The term between brackets measures the proportion of the maximal value of gross profits G realised by the industry as a whole.
4 Stage 1: the entry subgames There are two entry subgames to be considered: one for the non-collusive game and one for the collusive game. For the non-collusive game, the question to be answered is: what is the maximal number of players, z, who are entering in the presence of cartel laws? This is the number z such that IT, > 0. 13), we have that if 44 Explicit collusion or 2 1 or For II, = 0, z = 2y/s — 1. Note that s is not necessarily an integer. Let m be the greatest integer not greater than 2y/s.